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Abstract 
 
We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and 
vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient 
strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games the coordination rates do 
not vary with stake size and are close to the levels predicted by both the mixed Nash 
equilibrium and the level-k model used by Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008). 
These findings suggest that players’ mode of reasoning, and the extent to which it can be 
explained by team reasoning or a level-k model, crucially depends on the symmetry or 
asymmetry of the coordination payoffs. 
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1. Introduction 
The experimental literature on focal points (Schelling 1960) in pure and asymmetric one-shot 
simultaneous-move coordination games have found that payoff asymmetries weaken the 
power of focal points to serve as a coordination device. This is especially the case for focal 
points based on purely contextual aspects such as the game’s “labels” – see Crawford, 
Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008), Isoni, Poulsen, Sugden, and Tsutsui (2013,2014), and 
Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2013).  
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   In this paper we investigate the hypothesis that the amount of money at stake (the stake 
size) might play an important role for the power of label-based focal points in these types of 
coordination games. Our intuition is quite simple: Suppose the monetary gains from 
successful coordination increase. This might make subjects more likely to engage in a focal-
point (or team-based; see Sugden (1993)) mode of thinking, and hence more likely to choose 
the label-based focal point. High stakes might focus and sharpen players' minds, making them 
think harder about how they can coordinate, and hence be more likely to appreciate the 
usefulness of relying on the focal aspect to help them to coordinate.   
   We test the hypothesis that the stake size matters for the power of label-based focal points 
by varying the stake size in coordination games similar to those used in Crawford, Gneezy, 
and Rottenstreich (2008), henceforth CGR. These are battle of the sexes games with two 
strategies for each player, two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and a symmetric mixed Nash 
equilibrium. The strategies are labelled “A” and “B”. We hypothesized that choosing A 
would be more salient than B because A is the first letter of the alphabet.3 We independently 
vary the stake size and whether the game is symmetric or asymmetric (i.e., whether players 
are indifferent between the pure strategy equilibria or they prefer a different equilibrium). 
This allows us to measure the effects of payoff asymmetry on behavior for a given stake size 
(low, medium, or high stakes), and the effect of changing the stake size on the power of the 
focal point for a given payoff structure (symmetric or asymmetric payoffs).  
   While there is a large literature on stake size effects in economic experiments4, we believe 
that we are the first to examine the effects of stake sizes on the power of focal points in 
symmetric and asymmetric coordination games. 
   We vary stake size as follows. In the symmetric game with medium stakes, players 1 and 2 
each receive 5 British pounds5 (£5) from successful coordination, and zero otherwise. In the 
symmetric low-stakes game, all payoffs are divided by ten, such that coordination gives each 
player £0.5. In the symmetric high-stakes game, all medium payoffs are multiplied by three, 
such that coordination gives each player £15. In the asymmetric low6, medium, and high 
stake games the coordination payoffs are (£0.5, £0.6) and (£0.6, £0.5), (£5, £6) and (£6, £5), 
and (£15, £18) and (£18, £15), respectively.  
   We observe that increasing the stakes in symmetric games from low to medium has no 
significant impact on coordination, while going from medium to high significantly increases 
                                                        
3 Other examples include “A-grade student” versus “B-grade student”, and “Plan A” versus “Plan B”. 
4 For an extensive survey please see Camerer and Hogarth (1999). 
5 At the time of the experiment £5=$7.60. 
6 The Low-stake games were proposed to us by an anonymous referee; we are grateful for this suggestion. 
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the power of the focal point. In asymmetric games, on the other hand, increasing the stakes 
does not make the focal point more salient and there is no impact on the coordination rate.  
   Increasing the stake size in symmetric games thus makes the game’s labels more salient, 
and payoff asymmetry reduces the salience of the label-based focal point significantly, no 
matter how much is at stake. One interpretation is that the presence of payoff asymmetries 
causes players to reason in a more individualistic, and less team-based, manner (see also the 
discussion in CGR, and Faillo, Smerilli, and Sugden (2013)). Players are less likely to notice 
the game’s labels, and/or they lose faith that the other player will notice and act on them. 
Future research should seek to disentangle these explanations.7 
   Our findings are consistent with those from CGR who find that payoff asymmetries 
significantly weaken the power of focal points. Our results extend their findings by showing 
that the power of focal points vanishes when payoff asymmetries are introduced, even when 
the stake size is increased significantly. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Game theory predicts that changing a game’s payoffs, by multiplying all the payoffs by a 
positive number or adding/subtracting a constant from all payoffs, will not affect players’ 
equilibrium behavior. However, the experimental evidence on this prediction is mixed, as 
shown in Camerer and Hogarth (1999), who provide a very extensive literature survey on the 
effect of stake sizes in a large variety of games. In some games players’ choices are not 
affected by the fact that payoffs are scaled up or down. In other games, however, Camerer 
and Hogarth (1999) note that players’ behavior are different when the payoffs are higher.  
   Feltovich (2011), Feltovich, Iwasaki, and Oda (2012), and Rydval and Ortmann (2005) 
study the effect of varying payoffs in Hawk Dove and Stag-Hunt games in order to 
investigate whether loss aversion is a robust empirical phenomenon; see also Cachon and 
Camerer (1996) who investigate loss aversion in a median-effort game. They find evidence 
that when payoffs are negative, subjects make very different strategic choices than when 
payoffs are positive, because subjects dislike losses more than they like making gains. These 
papers do not investigate the effect of stake sizes on label-based focal points. Moreover, in 
our experiment subjects cannot make losses, so the focus of our paper differs from these 
studies.8 
                                                        
7 See for example Faillo, Smerilli, and Sugden (2013). 
8 Other experiments have investigated the effects of stake sizes on players’ choices in Prisoners’ Dilemma games, ultimatum 
games, and trust games. The conclusions are once again mixed, with some studies confirming the game theoretic prediction 
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3. Experimental Design 
Participants made decisions in a one-shot simultaneous-move 2x2 coordination game.9 In 
order to preserve the one-shot nature of the games, each subject only participated in one 
treatment (between-subject design) and played its game only once.10  
   In all the games each strategy was labelled with a letter: “A” and “B”. Although there is a 
wide variety of possible labels (e.g., letters, words, numbers, colours, or graphic patterns; see 
Bardsley, Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (2010) and Hargreaves Heap, Rojo Arjona, 
and Sugden (2014), using letters is advantageous because the choice is simple for participants 
to understand and transcends personal biases and interpretation that could be present with 
most other labels designed by the experimenters. The use of letters is similar to the 
experiments by CGR, where strategies were labelled as “X” and “Y”.  
   As in CGR we explore two payoff structures. The first is a pure coordination game, while 
the second is a “battle of the sexes” game. Following CGR we refer to the first as a 
“symmetric” and the second as an “asymmetric” game (see Table 1). Although in both types 
of coordination games there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) and one mixed-
strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE), the experimental literature has established that subjects use 
the label-based focal point to coordinate in the former game, thereby achieving coordination 
rates that are significantly higher than those predicted the MSNE (Schelling (1960); Mehta, 
Starmer, and Sugden (1994a); Bardsley et al. (2010); Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich 
(2008)). On the other hand, CGR find that labels lose their coordination-enhancing power in 
asymmetric coordination games (see also Poulsen et al. (2013) and Isoni et al. (2014)). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
and other studies showing that subjects’ behavior is affected by stake sizes. See for example Andersen et al (2011), Cameron 
(1999), Clark and Sefton (2001), Darai and Grätz (2010), Cameron (1999), Carpenter, Verhoogen, and Burks (2005), and 
Kocher, Martinsson, and Visser (2008), and Roth and Slonim (1998). Again, none of these studies consider the effect of 
stake sizes in coordination games with focal points. Other studies outside the realm of coordination and social dilemma 
games include Parco, Rapoport, and Stein (2002), Ariely et al (2009), Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992), and Vieider (2012).   
9 As in CGR we choose one-shot games because we wish to concentrate on the coordination power of the salient label and 
abstract away from other mechanisms that can aid coordination, such as repeated interaction (e.g., through learning, 
reputation building, and reciprocity). 
10 Although we could have used a within-subject design and not provide feedback on the outcomes until the end of the 
experiment, we choose not to because such a design would have introduced the possibility of order and learning effects,, 
which we wanted to avoid. 
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Table 1: 2x2 coordination game 
 
Symmetric game: a1=a2=b1=b2.  
Asymmetric game: a1=b2<a2=b1 
 
   For both payoff structures we implemented three stake size levels: Low, Medium and Large. 
The Medium-stake coordination payoffs were (£5, £5) and (£5, £6), (£6, £5), in the 
symmetric and asymmetric game, respectively. These earnings are comparable to the usual 
earnings for a thirty-minute lab session. The Low-stake payoffs were obtained by dividing the 
medium payoffs by ten, that is: (£0.5, £0.5) and (£0.5, £0.6), (£0.6, £0.5), respectively. The 
High-stake payoffs were obtained by multiplying the medium-stake payoffs by three, 
bringing them to (£15, £15), and (£15, £18), (£18, £15)11. This is a significant reward for a 
session involving a single (binary) decision and lasting only about 25 minutes. Regardless of 
the stake sizes, participants also received a £2 participation fee, and in the Low stake 
treatments they were given an additional £2 for completing the feedback. The former 
payment was announced at the beginning of the experiment, while the additional payment 
was only announced after participants submitted their decision in the coordination game.  
Summarizing, we apply a 2x3 between-subjects factorial design. Two independent variables 
are manipulated: payoff structure (Symmetric, Asymmetric) and stake size (Low, Medium 
and High). Consequently we ran six treatments: Symmetric Low (SL), Symmetric Medium 
(SM), Symmetric High (SH), Asymmetric Low (AL), Asymmetric Medium (SM), and 
Asymmetric High (AH). Table 2 shows the payoff matrices. 
 
 
 
                                                        
11 One advantage of raising the stake size by simply scaling up all money amounts by a common factor is 
that all relative magnitudes, and hence the mixed Nash equilibrium, as well as the level-k prediction in 
Crawford et al. (2008), remain unchanged. Of course, when we go from (5, 6) to (15, 18) payoffs, the 
absolute payoff difference between the low and the high coordination payoff is increased, from 1 to 3, and 
this might be behaviorally relevant. A referee pointed out that this could be investigated by comparing 
payoffs (5, 6) and (15, 16). This is something that can be investigated in future work. 
 
P1 A B
A a1,a2 0,0
B 0,0 b1,b2
P2
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Table 2: Experimental treatments 
 
Note: p = probability that P1 plays A, q = probability that P2 plays A. 
 
 
4. Experimental Procedures 
A total of 288 students from University of East Anglia (Norwich, UK) participated in the 
study (average age=23 years; 163 females and 125 males). Participants were recruited online 
using ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and hroot (Bock, Nicklisch and Baetge, 2012). On average a 
session lasted 25 minutes. We conducted a total of twenty-four sessions (four per treatment), 
which all took place at the CBESS Zicer lab facility. All data were collected during March 
and April 2013, except the SL and AL data which were collected during November 2014.  
 For each treatment we recruited 48 subjects (24 pairs). The instructions explained that they 
would be randomly matched with another participant in the room and that all decisions would 
be anonymous (see Appendix 1). Half of the participants were assigned to the “Person 1” 
(P1) and the other half to the “Person 2” (P2) player role.  
   Each participant received a copy of the instructions (see Appendix 1), and an empty (white) 
envelope was placed on their desk. After the instructions had been read out, participants 
received a brown envelope containing two pieces of paper. Each piece of paper was labelled 
with a letter (A or B) and the monetary reward that each participant would get if he or she 
P1 A p q  Coord. rates
A £0.5, £0.5 £0, £0
B £0, £0 £0.5, £0.5
A £5, £5 £0, £0
B £0, £0 £5, £5
A £15, £15 £0, £0
B £0, £0 £15, £15
A £0.5, £0.6 £0, £0
B £0, £0 £0.6, £0.5
A £5, £6 £0, £0
B £0, £0 £6, £5
A £15, £18 £0, £0
B £0, £0 £18, £15
50.0%
50.0%
50.0%
49.6%
49.6%
Symmetric Low (SL)
Symmetric Medium (SM)
Symmetric High (SH)
Asymmetric Low (AL)
Mixed strategy Nash equilibria
49.6%
Treatment
0.5000 0.5000
0.5000 0.5000
Asymmetric Medium (AM)
Asymmetric High (AH)
P2
B
0.4545 0.5455
0.5000 0.5000
0.4545 0.5455
0.4545 0.5455
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and the co-participant chose the same piece of paper. The instructions made it clear that if the 
two matched participants chose a different piece of paper they would receive only the 
participation fee (£2). Participants were informed that they had to take the two pieces of 
paper out of the brown envelope and put them on the desk in front of them. They then had to 
choose one of the two pieces of paper (A or B) and put it inside the white envelope, which 
later on would be collected by the experimenter.12 
   Participants were given as much time as they needed to make their decision. Once all 
participants had put the chosen piece of paper in the white envelope, one of the experimenters 
collected all the white envelopes. A demographics and feedback questionnaire was then 
administered using paper and pencil procedure (see Appendix 2). 
 
5. Results 
Table 3 summarizes the results. In the symmetric games (SL, SM and SH) Player 1 and 
Player 2’s (P1 and P2) choices can be theoretically pooled since there is no difference 
between the two roles (i.e., for both players, coordinating on any of the two alternatives 
yields exactly the same payoff). The table also reports for each treatment the coordination 
rate implied by the data; this is often referred to as the “expected coordination rate” (ECR), 
and in what follows we will use this terminology. ECR measures the probability that two 
different participants selected at random from the set of participants choose the same strategy, 
i.e., it measures the probability of coordination within a given treatment.13 These are also 
shown in Figure 1. Finally, as a benchmark the table reports the expected coordination rate 
predicted by the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) for each game.   
Table 3: Results  
                                                        
12 In half of the brown envelopes given to the participants, the paper with “A” was on top; in the other half, the one with “B” 
was on top. Subjects were required to take the two pieces of paper out of the brown envelope and put them on the desk 
themselves, in order to minimize the potential nuisance effects that could arise if the experimenters had already laid out the 
pieces of papers on the participants’ desks. For example, in the latter case, subjects might find it salient to choose the top or 
left piece of paper.  
13 For the symmetric games P1s and P2s are theoretically poolable; therefore for each label k=A,B, let nk be the numbers of 
participants (P1s and P2s) who choose label k, and let N be the total number of participants. Then ECRsymm = 
 
  











k
kk
N
n
N
n
1
1
 (see Mehta et al. (1994b, 663)). For the asymmetric games, the ECR is equal to the 
product of the proportions of players 1 and 2 who choose A plus the product of the proportions of players 1 and 2 who 
choose B; that is, ECRasym = 











k
kk
N
j
N
i
 where ik is the number of P1s who choose label k, and jk the number of P2s 
who choose label k. 
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Figure 1: Expected coordination rates 
 
 
 
5.1 Symmetric Games 
In all symmetric games (SL, SM and SH), a significant majority of the subjects chose the 
letter “A” (85.4%, 83.3% and 97.9%, respectively). We can reject the hypothesis that they 
chose randomly between “A” and “B” (binomial test, p<0.001). In all three treatments the 
expected coordination rates (ECRs) are significantly higher (74.6% in SL, 71.6% in SM and 
95.8% in SH) than the MSNE and random choice coordination rates (binomial test, p<0.005). 
Moreover, we find a statistically significant difference between the low and the high-stake 
treatment, and between the medium and the high stake treatment. In the latter, a significantly 
higher number of subjects chose the strategy with the salient label “A” than in the both the 
Symmetric Low Symmetric Medium Symmetric High Asymmetric Low Asymmetric Medium Asymmetric High
(SL) (SM) (SH) (AL) (AM) (AH)
Payoffs for coordinating 
on "A"
£0.5, £ 0.5 £5, £5 £15, £15 £0.5, £ 0.6 £5, £6 £15, £18
Payoffs for coordinating 
on "B"
£0.5, £ 0.5 £5, £5 £15, £15 £0.6, £ 0.5 £6, £5 £18, £15
N 48 48 48 24 P1s 24 P1s 24 P1s
P1s and P2s P1s and P2s P1s and P2s 24 P2s 24 P2s 24 P2s
N choosing "A" 41(85.4%) 40(83.3%) 47(97.9%) 13(54.2%) P1s 12(50%) P1s 11(45.8%) P1s
P1s and P2s P1s and P2s P1s and P2s 11(45.8%) P2s 10(41.7%) P2s 13(54.2%) P2s
Expected coordination 
rates 
74.6% 71.6% 95.8% 49.7% 50.0% 49.7%
Mixed strategy Nash 
equilibria coordination 
rates
50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 49.6% 49.6% 49.6%
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low-stake treatment and the medium stake treatment (chi2 test, p<0.05) and the resulting 
ECR is significantly higher in the high stake treatment (chi2 test, p<0.01). We found no 
significant difference between the low and the medium stake treatment.  
 
5.2 Asymmetric Games 
In the asymmetric treatments (AL, AM, and AH), the strategy “A” was not chosen with 
higher frequency than “B”, not even by players 2 (P2s) for whom the payoff-salient strategy 
was “A” (only 45.8%, 41.7%, and 54.2% of P2 chose A in AL, AM and AH, respectively). In 
the three treatments the observed distributions of choices for both players are not 
significantly different from a binary random distribution (binomial test, p>0.10) and the 
ECRs are substantially lower than in the symmetric treatments and very close to both the 
MSNE and random-choice coordination rates.  
   We find no evidence of a change in the coordination pattern between low and high-stakes 
treatments. Although a larger number of subjects chose their payoff preferred strategy in the 
high than in the medium-payoff treatment (54.2% vs. 41.7%), this difference is not 
statistically significant (chi2 test, p > 0.10). 
 
5.3 Comparison between Symmetric and Asymmetric Games 
The data show that a change in the payoff structure (symmetric versus asymmetric) affects 
the frequency of label-salient choices and coordination rates. If we compare the proportion of 
players who chose “A” in the asymmetric treatments (low, medium and high) with their 
symmetric (low, medium and high stakes) counterparts, we find that they are significantly 
lower (chi2 test, p<0.001). Furthermore, the ECRs in the asymmetric (low, medium and high 
stakes) treatments are also significantly lower than the coordination rates in their symmetric 
(low, medium and high stakes) treatment counterparts (chi2 test, p<0.05, p<0.10 and p<0.001, 
respectively).   
 
5.4. Comparison with CGR 
CGR find in their symmetric labelled ($5, $5) treatment that 76% of the players chose “X”, 
giving an ECR of 64%. The percentages choosing “A” and the ECR in our symmetric A-B 
games are similar, 85.4%, 83.3% and 71.6%, respectively. So the salience of “A” relative to 
“B” is similar to the salience of “X” relative to “Y”. In their asymmetric ($5, $6) game 
coordination falls, since 33% of P1s chose “X” and 61% of P2s chose “X”; the ECR is 46%. 
In our asymmetric payoff treatments the ECR is very similar (around 50%).  
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6. Explaining the Data 
In this section we consider the extent to which different theories can explain our main finding, 
that higher stakes increase coordination in symmetric but not asymmetric games. 
 
6.1 The Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
The MSNE predicts that an increase in stake size should have no effect on players’ choices in 
equilibrium. Table 3 above shows that the MSNE clearly fails to organise our data for the 
symmetric games with both low and high payoffs. For the asymmetric games, however, the 
ECR is not statistically different from the one predicted by the MSNE.  
 
6.2 Level-k Modelling 
The level-k model (see, e.g., Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008), Crawford, Costa-
Gomes, and Iriberri (2013), Nagel (1995), and Stahl and Wilson (1995) postulates that 
players have different level of strategic sophistication, and that players with a high level of 
strategic sophistication best reply to players with lower level of strategic sophistication. 
   Such a level-k model predicts that there should be no effect of a change in stake size on 
behavior and the coordination rate in both the asymmetric and asymmetric games. The reason 
is that since L0’s behavior is not affected by a change in stake size, the same is true for L1 
and L2’s behavior (see Appendix 3 for more details). This is not consistent with the data for 
our symmetric game; however, the data from the asymmetric games are in line with the level-
k prediction, since the ECR in the high- and low-stake asymmetric games are very close. 
 
6.3 Team Reasoning 
Focal point–based or team reasoning (see Bacharach (2006), Bardsley et al. (2010), Schelling 
(1960), and Sugden (1993)) can be defined as each player trying to find a strategy that if used 
by both players would lead to an outcome that is better for each player than what they would 
get if they used a different decision rule. In our setting, team reasoning makes the 
recommendation that players should choose the label-salient strategy A in both the symmetric 
and asymmetric games; this is clearly inconsistent with the data from the asymmetric games. 
 
 
 11 
It also does not explain why people become better at coordinating in symmetric games when 
stakes increase14.  
 The data show that neither the level-k model by CGR, nor a very simple team reasoning 
approach, can account for all the data. Clearly, much more work is needed to explain why 
players’ mode of reasoning seem to switch from a level-k to a team-reasoning mode as 
payoffs switch from asymmetric to symmetric. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
Does an increase in stake size affect players’ ability to coordinate on a focal point? We 
collect data from symmetric and asymmetric games with a label salient focal point and that 
differ in stake size. Our results show that when players have more at stake in symmetric 
games then coordination on the salient focal point increases significantly. But in asymmetric 
games, increasing the stakes has no effect on coordination. These findings show that players’ 
mode of reasoning differs depending on whether the game is symmetric or asymmetric, as 
also shown in Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich’s (2008) study. 
 
  
                                                        
14A more refined team reasoning hypothesis for symmetric games is that higher stakes makes people more likely to use 
labels as a coordination device since the loss in terms of foregone earnings increase. Again, this begs the question of why we 
do not observe the same in asymmetric games, and raises the deeper question of why team reasoning only seems to apply to 
symmetric and not asymmetric games.   
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8. Appendices 
 
8.1 Appendix 1: Experimental Instructions 
During this experiment you will be randomly matched with another participant in the room. 
The two of you will play anonymously. That is, no one will learn whom they are matched 
with. 
You and the participant you are matched with will be referred to as Person 1 and Person 2.   
 
You are Person________, and the participant you are matched with is Person_______. 
 
You and the participant you are matched with will make a decision in a task that will be 
described shortly. How much you earn depends on your decision and on the decision of the 
other person. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. In 
addition, you will receive £2 for taking part in the experiment. 
 
Please do not turn this page over until you are instructed to do so by the experimenter. 
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The task:  
 
Each of you will receive two envelopes, one brown and one white. The white envelope is 
already on your desk and is marked with the number of the desk where you are sitting. The 
brown envelope will be given to you by the experimenter.  
Each brown envelope contains two pieces of paper. Each piece of paper has a letter and 
payoffs (money earnings) for Person 1 and Person 2 written on it. Your brown envelope has 
the same content as the brown envelopes given to all the other participants. 
When you are instructed to do so by the experimenter, please open the brown envelope, take 
out the two pieces of paper, and put them on the desk in front of you.  
You must choose one of the two pieces of paper.  
If you and the person you are matched with choose the same piece of paper, then each of you 
will earn the corresponding payoffs written on that piece of paper.  
If you choose different pieces of paper, then you both receive nothing (each person gets £0).  
In other words, the only way for you and the other person to earn money is to choose the 
same piece of paper. 
Once you have decided which piece of paper you want to choose, please put it inside the 
white envelope (the one with the desk number on it). Also, put the other piece of paper back 
in the brown envelope. The experimenter will then come and collect the white envelope. 
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8.2 Appendix 2: Feedback form 
 
       Your desk number: _________ 
FEEDBACK FORM 
 
Gender (male M/female F): ________________ 
Age: ___________________ 
Your area of study: _______________________  
Nationality: ______________________________ 
BA/BSc /MA/MSc/Ph.D/Other: _______________________  
 
Please provide feedback here (on how you made your decision and any other aspect you 
believe is important):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
8.3 Appendix 3: Level-k Analysis 
In what follows, we denote Player 1 as P1, and Player 2 as P2. 
 
8.3.1 (£5, £6) Asymmetric Games 
As in CGR (2008) we assume that P1 Type L0 (P1 L0) chooses “A” with probability 1-p<1/2, 
and “B” with probability p>1/2. P2 Type L0 (P2 L0) chooses “A” with probability p>1/2, and 
“B” with probability (1-p<1/2).  
   P1 L1 gets expected payoff 5p when choosing “A”, and expected payoff 6(1-p) from 
choosing “B”. Therefore P1 L1 chooses “A” when 5p>6(1-p). In other words P1 L1 chooses 
“A” if p>6/11, and “B” if p<6/11. P2 L1 gets expected payoff 6(1-p) when choosing “A”, and 
expected payoff 5p from choosing “B”. Therefore P2 L1 chooses “A” when 6(1-p) >5p. In 
other words P2 L1 chooses “A” if p<6/11, and “B” if p>6/11. 
   P1 L2 players chooses “A” is p<6/11, and “B” if p>6/11, and P2 L2 chooses “A” is p>6/11, 
and “B” if p<6/11. 
 
Aggregate choice proportions: Suppose p<6/11. Denote by 1-q, the probability that P1 
chooses “A”, and the probability that he/she chooses “B” is q. When q=0.7 the choices 
probabilities are (0.3, 0.7). For P2, the probabilities that he/she chooses “A” is q, and that 
he/she chooses “B” is 1-q, With q=0.7 this gives (0.7, 0.3). The ECR is thus 2q(1-q)=0.42. 
When p>6/11, the P1 choice probabilities are (0.7, 0.3), and those for P2 are (0.3, 0.7). The 
ECR is thus 2q(1-q)=0.42. 
 
8.3.2 (£15, £18) Asymmetric Games 
As in the low-payoff game, L0 players choose the payoff-salient strategy with probability 
p>1/2. In this game, coordination on “A” gives payoff £15 to P1 L0, and coordination on “B” 
gives payoff £18 to P1 L0. Therefore the payoff salient strategy for P1 L0 is “B”. So P1 L0 
chooses “A” with probability 1-p<1/2, and “B” with probability p>1/2.  
Similarly, P2 L0 chooses “A” with probability p>1/2, and “B” with probability (1-p<1/2).  
 
P1 L1 gets expected payoff 15p from choosing “A”, and expected payoff 18(1-p) from 
choosing “B”. Therefore P1 L1 chooses A when 15p>18(1-p). In other words P1 L1 chooses 
A if p>6/11, and B if p<6/11. These conditions are the same as in the asymmetric game with 
low payoffs. The behavior of L1, and hence also L2, is therefore not sensitive to the stake 
size, and the same is true for the expected coordination rate (ECR). 
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8.3.3 (£0.5,£0.6) Asymmetric Games 
It is straightforward to verify that the predictions of the level-k model coincide with the ones 
for the Medium and High stake size games. 
 
8.3.4 (£5, £5) Symmetric Games 
In this game P1 L0 and P2 L0 choose “A” with probability p>1/2, and “B” with probability 
1-p<1/2. It follows that P1 L1 and P2 L1, and hence also P1 L2 and P2 L2, choose “A”, 
giving ECR=1. 
 
8.3.5 (£15, £15) Symmetric Games 
Type L0 again choose “A” if p>1/2, and b otherwise. As above in this case all players choose 
“A” if p>1/2, and otherwise choose “B”. Thus the behavior of all L1 and L2 players is the 
same as in the (£5, £5) game. 
 
8.3.6 (£0.5,£0.5) Symmetric Games 
It is again straightforward to verify that the predictions of the level-k model are exactly the 
same as for the other symmetric games. 
  
 
 
 17 
References  
Bacharach, Michael. 2006. Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory.   
Edited by Nathalie Gold and Robert Sugden. Princeton University Press. 
 
Andersen, Steffen, Seda Ertaç, Uri Gneezy, Moshe Hoffman, and John A. List. 2011. “Stakes 
Matter in Ultimatum Games.” American Economic Review 101 (7): 3427–39.  
Bardsley, Nicholas, Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden. 2010. “Explaining 
Focal Points: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory Versus Team Reasoning.” The Economic 
Journal 120: 40–79. 
Bock, Olaf, Andreas Nicklisch and Ingmar Baetge. 2012. "hroot: Hamburg registration and 
organization online tool." WiSo-HH Working Paper Series No. 1, 2012. 
Cachon, Gerard P., and Colin F. Camerer. 1996. “Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in 
Experimental Coordination Games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1): 165–94. 
Camerer, Colin F, and Robin M Hogarth. 1999. “The Effects of Financial Incentives in 
Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework.” Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 19 (1-3): 7–42. 
Cameron, Lisa A. 1999. “Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence 
from Indonesia.” Economic Inquiry 37 (1): 47–59. 
Carpenter, Jeffrey, Eric Verhoogen, and Stephen Burks. 2005. “The Effect of Stakes in 
Distribution Experiments.” Economics Letters 86 (3) (March): 393–398. 
Clark, Kenneth, and Martin Sefton. 2001. “The Sequential Prisoner’ s Dilemma: Evidence on 
Reciprocation.” The Economic Journal 111 (468): 51–68. 
Crawford, Vincent P, Costa-Gomes Miguel A, and Nagore Iriberri. 2013. “Structural Models 
of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications.” Journal of 
Economic Literature 51 (1): 5–62. 
Crawford, Vincent P, Uri Gneezy, and Yuval Rottenstreich. 2008. “The Power of Focal 
Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination 
Failures.” The American Economic Review 98 (4): 1443–1458. 
Darai, Donja, and Silvia Grätz. 2010. “Golden Balls: A Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiment.” 
Socioeconomic Institute University of Zurich: Working Paper No. 1006. 
Faillo, Marco, Alessandra Smerilli, and Robert Sugden. 2013. “The Roles of Level-k and 
Team Reasoning in Solving Coordination Games.” CEEL: Working Paper 6–13. 
Feltovich, Nick. 2011. “The Effect of Subtracting a Constant from All Payoffs in a Hawk-
Dove Game: Experimental Evidence of Loss Aversion in Strategic Behavior.” Southern 
Economic Journal 77 (4): 814–826. 
 
 
 18 
Feltovich, Nick, Atsushi Iwasaki, and Sobei H. Oda. 2012. “Payoff Levels, Loss Avoidance, 
and Equilibrium Selection in Games With Multiple Equilibria: An Experimental Study.” 
Economic Inquiry 50 (4) (October 22): 932–952. 
Greiner, Ben. 2004. “An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments.” MPRA: 
Paper No. 13513. 
Hargreaves Heap, Shaun Rojo Arjona, David, and Robert Sugden. 2014. “How Portable Is 
Level-0 Behaviour? A Test of Level-k Theory in Games with Non-Neutral Frames.” 
Econometrica. 
Isoni, Andrea, Anders Poulsen, Robert Sugden, and Kei Tsutsui. 2013. “Focal Points in Tacit 
Bargaining Problems: Experimental Evidence.” European Economic Review 59 (April): 
167–188. 
———. 2014. “Equality, Efficiency, and Labeling: An Experimental Investigation of Focal 
Points in Explicit Bargaining.” American Economic Review. 
Kachelmeier, Steven J., and Mohamed Shehata. 2013. “Examining Risk Preferences Under 
High Monetary Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People’s Republic of 
China.” American Economic Review 82 (5): 1120–41. 
Kocher, Martin G, Peter Martinsson, and Martine Visser. 2008. “Does Stake Size Matter for 
Cooperation and Punishment?” Economics Letters 99 (3) (June): 508–511. 
Mehta, Judith, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden. 1994a. “Focal Points in Pure Coordination 
Games: An Experimental Investigation.” Theory and Decision 36: 163–185. 
———. 1994b. “The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure 
Coordination Games.” The American Economic Review 84 (3): 658–673. 
Nagel, Rosemarie. 1995. “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study.” 
American Economic Review 85 (5): 1313–1326. 
Poulsen, Anders, Odile Poulsen, and Kei Tsutsui. 2013. “The Power of Focal Points in 
Asymmetric Coordination Games: The Role of Complexity.” Mimeo: 1–25. 
Rydval, Ondrej, and Andreas Ortmann. 2005. “Loss Avoidance as Selection Principle: 
Evidence from Simple Stag-Hunt Games.” Economics Letters 88: 101–7. 
Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press. 
Slonim, Robert, and Alvin E Roth. 1998. “Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An 
Experiment in the Slovak Republic.” Econometrica 66 (3): 569–96.  
Stahl, Dale O., and Paul W. Wilson. 1995. “On Players’ Models of Other Players: Theory and 
Experimental Evidence.” Games and Economic Behavior 10: 218–254. 
Sugden, R. 1993. “Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior.” 
Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1): 69–89. 
 
 
 19 
 Vieider, Ferdinand M. 2012. “Moderate Stake Variations for Risk and Uncertainty, Gains 
and Losses: Methodological Implications for Comparative Studies.” Economics 
Letters 117 (3): 718–21. 
